Identifying the Two Camps of Assertions about Ignorance
The Indian Buddhist tenet systems divide into two camps of assertions regarding ignorance (ma-rig-pa, Skt. avidyā):
- One camp follows the assertions of the two Asanga brothers, Vasubandhu and Asanga, and includes Vaibhashika, Sautrantika Followers of Scripture and Chittamatra Followers of Scripture. For them, ignorance, a debilitated knowing of something, is an anti-knowing mental factor that merely stupefies the mind. By its own force, it does not cognitively take its object in a reversed manner – for instance, it cannot, on its own, cognitively take our body as “me” or “mine.” It is equivalent to “naivety” (gti-mug, Skt. moha), one of the three poisonous mental factors, and not a type of the mental factor of discriminating (shes-rab, Skt. prajñā).
- The other camp follows Dharmakirti’s assertions and includes Sautrantika Followers of Reason, Chittamatra Followers of Reason and both Sautrantika-Svatantrika and Prasangika Madhyamaka. For them, there are two types of ignorance. One is a misknowing mental factor that, by its own force, cognitively does take its object in a reversed manner. It is a disturbed type of the mental factor of discriminating. The other is equivalent to naivety and merely stupefies the mind due to the absence of a correct way of cognizing its object.
Sey Ngawang Tashi summarizes the difference between the two camps in Analysis of the Extremes (252-253):
The definition of a debilitated knowing (of something) is a stupefying mental factor that is heterogenous with and opposite to an abilitated knowing (of it). This is because it is explained that when “de-” is a negating prefix that indicates the opposite (of something), and when an abilitated knowing (of something) is taken mainly to be a (accurate, supramundane) discriminating (of it), then a debilitated knowing (of something) is heterogenous with and opposite to an (accurate, supramundane) discriminating (of it).
Setting a debilitated knowing (of something) as the opposite of an abilitated knowing (of it) is common to the four tenet systems, where the way of it being the opposite of an abilitated knowing is like setting “a false friend” as the opposite of “a true friend” and “false words” as the opposite of “true words.” Nevertheless, there are differences (among the tenet systems) concerning the meaning (of their being the opposite).
The two Asanga brothers (Vasubandhu and Asanga) accept that the meaning of (a debilitated knowing of something) being the opposite of a (supramundane) discriminating (of it) is that it is a mind that, by its own force, does not apprehend (its object.) Because of its being like a darkness that befalls the mind, (anti-knowing) merely stupefies (the mind), but by its own force, it does not cognitively take its own object in a reversed manner.
For the glorious Dharmakirti and the two Madhyamaka (traditions, Svatantrika and Prasangika), the meaning of (a debilitated knowing of something) being the opposite of a (supramundane) discriminating (of it) is that, without being merely just that (just a stupefying mental factor), it is a disturbed discriminating that cognitively takes (its object) in a reversed manner. This is because they assert as the opposite of a (supramundane) discriminating (all mental factors that cognize with a disturbed view) like cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network as well. That is because they set a debased discriminating (mental factor) to be the opposite of a (accurate, supramundane) discriminating one.
(Tib.) rig pa’i ‘gal zla mi mthun phyogs kyi sems ‘byung rmongs pa de/ ma rig pa’i mtshan nyid yin te/ ma ‘gal zla ston pa’i dgag tshig dang rig pa gtso bor shes rab la byas na/ shes rab kyi ‘gal zla mi mthun phyogs la ma rig pa zhes bshad pa’i phyir/ de la rig pa’i ‘gal zla rig par ‘jog par grub mtha’ bzhi ka mthun la/ rig pa’i ‘gal zla yin tshul ni mdza’ pa’i ‘gal zla mi mdza’ ba dang/ bden tshig gi ‘gal zla rdzun tshig tu ‘jog pa ltar yin yang/ don la khyad par yod de/ thogs med sku mched gnyis kyis rig pa shes rab kyi ‘gal pa’i don rang yul la rmongs pa tsam yin gyi rang stobs kyis phyin ci log tu mi ‘dzin pa’i mun pa babs pa lta bu yin pas rang stobs kyi ma rtogs pa’i blor ‘dod la/ dpal ldan chos grags dang dbu ma pa gnyis kyi ‘gal zla’i don de tsam kho na ma yin par rang stobs kyi yul phyin ci log tu ‘dzin pa’i shes rab nyon mongs can ‘jig lta lta bu la yang shes rab kyi ‘gal zla la bzhed pa’i phyir te/ shes rab ‘chal ba de shes rab kyi ‘gal zla ‘jog pa’i phyir ro/
As for the technical terms in this passage:
- A stupefying mental factor (rmongs-pa, Skt. moha) is a mental factor that disorients the mind. The Sanskrit term “moha” is often translated into Tibetan also as “gti-mug,” meaning “the mental factor of cognizing with naivety.” Here, “moha” is translated into Tibetan as “rmongs-pa,” “a stupefying mental factor,” highlighting the fact that the mental factor of cognizing with naivety stupefies the consciousness and all the other mental factors in the cognition, making them unfit to validly cognize the manner of existence and some of the characteristics of their own object.
- The “own” object (rang-yul) of a cognition is the second moment in the continuum of an immediately preceding cognitive object.
- A phenomenon that is heterogenous (mi-mthun phyogs, Skt. vipakṣa) with something else is one that is merely not that item – for example, “an apple” is heterogenous with “true words” because it is a member of the set of everything other than “true words.”
- A phenomenon that is the opposite (‘gal-zla, Skt. viparyaya) of something else is also heterogenous with it – for example, “false words” is a member of the set of everything other than “true words” as well as the opposite of “true words.”
- A mental factor that is reversed (phyin-ci log-pa, Skt. viparyāsa) from another mental factor is the cognitive opposite of it – for example, “an inaccurate discriminating mental factor” is the reverse of “an accurate discriminating mental factor.”
- A discriminating mental factor (shes-rab, Skt. prajñā) is a mental factor that sorts a mixed group of items. Within the group, it differentiates between those phenomena that are in accord with a certain criterion (for instance, those that are valid) and those that are not in accord and sorts them out with varying levels of accuracy and of certitude. It occurs in every moment of cognition and thus may or may not apprehend its object.
- An apprehending of an object (rtogs-pa, Skt. adhigama) is the accurate and decisive cognizing of an object. In non-technical, colloquial language, it is the accurate and decisive understanding of an object.
- Cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network (‘jig-tshogs lta-ba, Skt. satkāyadṛṣṭi) is a disturbing mental factor that inaccurately, but decisively, cognitively takes one of the five aggregates (a transitory network of body and mind) to be either “me” or “mine.”
- A disturbing mental factor (nyon-mongs, Skt. kleśa; affliction) is a mental factor that, when part of a cognition, makes us lose peace of mind and self-control.
- The five aggregates (phung-po lnga, Skt. pañcaskandha) are (1) forms of physical phenomena (sensory objects like sights and sounds and including the body), (2) types of consciousness (sensory or mental), (3) levels of feelings (happiness, unhappiness or a numb feeling that is neither), (4) distinguishings (of the defining characteristics of objects,) and (5) other variables that affect our experience (such as attention, concentration and assorted emotions). Each moment of our experience, day and night, is comprised of at least one item from each aggregate.
- “Me” refers to an atman (a self) of a person – a self or “soul” that is static (unaffected by anything), a solid whole (without any parts) and that can exist independently of the five aggregates (when liberated).
- “Mine” refers to the possession or habitat of “me.”
- A disturbed phenomenon (nyon-mongs-can, Skt. kliṣṭa) is one that is accompanied by a disturbing mental factor – specifically, by debilitated knowing.
- A disturbed discriminating (shes-rab nyon-mongs-can, Skt. kliṣṭaprajñā) is a discriminating that is accompanied by debilitated knowing. It is an incorrect variety of a discriminating mental factor.
- A debased discriminating (shes-rab ‘chal-ba) is a degenerated, unsound, discriminating mental factor.
All four Indian Buddhist tenet systems agree that the definition of ignorance, a debilitated knowing of something, is a stupefying mental factor that opposes and prevents an abilitated knowing (of it) from arising. They also agree that an abilitated knowing of something is equivalent to a discriminating mental factor that, with a supramundane mind, sorts between what accords and what does not accord with reality. Cognizing with a correct view, it chooses the one that accords with reality. Cognizing with an incorrect view, it chooses the one that does not accord with reality.
There are five disturbing mental factors that cognize with an incorrect view. Vasubandhu defines them as follows:
- Cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network (‘jig-tshogs lta-ba, Skt. satkāyadṛṣṭi) – taking a member of one of the aggregates as being “me” or “mine” as asserted by one of the non-Buddhist Indian tenet systems.
- Taking (a transitory network) to exist as one of two extremes (mthar-‘dzin-pa, Skt. antagrahadṛṣṭi) – when a member of one of the aggregates is identified as being identical with “me,” regarding that “me” as being static and unchanging during this lifetime and totally ending at death, with no rebirth. Or, when a member of one of the aggregates is identified as being “mine,” regarding that “me” that possesses it as being static and unchanging not only during this lifetime but also continuing as such into a next rebirth.
- Taking a disturbed view to be supreme (lta-ba mchog-tu ‘dzin-pa, Skt. dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) – regarding as the supreme view the cognizing of a transitory network with a disturbed view, cognizing something taking it to exist as one of two extremes, or cognizing something with a distorted view.
- A distorted view (log-lta, Skt. mithyādṛṣṭi) – regarding what are not the four noble truths as being the actual four noble truths.
- Taking disturbed morality or conduct to be supreme (tshul-khrims-dang brtul-zhugs mchog-tu ‘dzin-pa, Skt. śīlavṛtaparāmarśa) – regarding what is not the cause of the world or of liberation as being the cause, or the practices and disciplines that do not bring liberation, such as attaining one of the four levels of mental constancy (bsam-gtan, Skt. dhyāna) as bringing liberation.
The first two are obscured unspecified phenomena (bsgribs-pa’i lung ma-bstan, Skt. nivṛtāvyākṛta), while the last three are destructive phenomena. According to Vasubandhu, all five are accompanied and obscured by anti-knowing. They are also all accompanied by the mental factor of discriminating. Analyzing in accord with Vasubandhu’s assertions, consider the case of a cognition that includes the mental factor of cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network. It also includes, as a separate mental factor, the mental factor of discriminating. In accord with the disturbed view toward a transitory network that accompanies it, the discriminating sorts between the self being identical or not with a static, partless, independent atman and decides that it is identical. Discriminating chooses that false alternative because the anti-knowing in the cognition stupefies it. In this cognition, then, anti-knowing, discriminating and cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network are each distinct, individual mental factors.
Vasubandhu asserts that in the context of a cognition that includes one of the last three disturbing mental factors that cognize with an incorrect view, that disturbing mental factor with a view is not counted as a distinct, individual mental factor, but is counted, instead, as a type of disturbed discriminating. For example, when we take disturbed discipline or conduct to be supreme, we are sorting between different types of conduct and, because our accompanying anti-knowing stupefies our discriminating, we decide that a disturbed type of conduct, such as striving to attain one of the dhyanas (mental stabilization, four states of deep meditative absorption) is the supreme method for attaining liberation. Although taking disturbed discipline or conduct to be supreme and discriminating are not distinct, individual mental factors here, nevertheless, anti-knowing is distinct from them.
According to Dharmakirti, all five disturbing mental factors that cognize with an incorrect view are types of disturbed discriminating. As with Vasubandhu, misknowing accompanies all five, but unlike Vasubandhu, misknowing here is a type of disturbed discriminating – specifically, the type that is cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network – and, as such, it is not a distinct, individual mental factor.
For both Vasubandhu and Dharmakirti, then, the debilitated knowing of something (ignorance) is a mental factor that is the opposite of supramundane discriminating with a correct view. It opposes and prevents such discriminating from arising.
- For Vasubandhu, debilitated knowing is anti-knowing, which merely stupefies the mental factor of discriminating. Being disturbed by anti-knowing and stupefied, the discriminating becomes incorrect, and, in this way, correct discriminating is prevented from arising.
- For Dharmakirti, debilitated knowing is misknowing, equivalent to cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network, which is a type of disturbed discriminating. Because of that, whenever misknowing arises, being incorrect discriminating, it prevents correct discriminating from arising. Incorrect and correct discriminating cannot both be present in a cognition.
The Relation between a Debilitated Knowing of Something (Ignorance) and a Mental Factor of Cognizing It with a Disturbed View
The two camps differ, then, in terms of whether a debilitated knowing of something (ignorance) is a type of disturbing mental factor that cognizes it with a view. A view (lta-ba, Skt. dṛṣṭi) is a conclusive assessment (nges-rtog, Skt. nitīraṇa) of an object that ascribes to it its being a type of suffering, an origin of suffering, a state of cessation of suffering or a pathway of mind leading to a cessation. The conclusive assessment is always preceded by a fine analysis (nges-par dpyod-pa, Skt. upanidhyāna) of the object. The view, however, may be either a correct one or a distorted one – a so-called “bad view” (lta-ngan).
- An example of a mental factor that cognizes with a correct view is an abilitated knowing.
- An example of one that cognizes with a bad view is a mental factor of cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network.
As we have seen, an abilitated knowing of something apprehends its object, which means it accurately and decisively cognizes it. There are two ways of being heterogenous with and opposite to how an abilitated knowing cognizes its object – not apprehending it and distortedly apprehending it:
- “Not apprehending an object” means cognizing it neither accurately nor decisively. According to the two Asanga brothers, an anti-knowing mental factor, by its own force, does not cognitively take its object in a reversed manner and thus does not cognize it with a view. Because it merely stupefies the mind, anti-knowing does not apprehend its object; it is neither accurate nor decisive.
- “Distortedly apprehending its object” means cognizing it inaccurately but decisively. According to Dharmakirti, a misknowing mental factor, by its own force, does cognitively take its object in a reversed manner and thus does cognize it with a view, albeit a so-called “bad view.” Being a view, even a bad view is a conclusive assessment preceded by a fine analysis, and so even though it is inaccurate, it is still decisive. Therefore, misknowing, which cognizes with a bad view, is also decisive but inaccurate.
The difference between the two camps on this issue of cognizing with or without a view can also be seen in terms of their assertions concerning the relation between a debilitating knowing of something and a mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view. Concerning the first camp of assertions, Sey Ngawang Tashi, Analysis of Extremes (261-262), explains:
General Vaibhashika and the two Asanga brothers assert that if it is an anti-knowing mental factor, it is pervasive with it being an anti-knowing mental factor that does not cognize with a view. This is because they do not accept the mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view as being what an anti-knowing mental factor is. The reason for it not being what an anti-knowing mental factor is is that, of the two ways of being heterogenous with and opposite to a knowing mental factor – not an apprehending of something and a distorted apprehending of it – it (an anti-knowing mental factor) is a mind that is not an apprehending of something. And so, they assert that when it (an anti-knowing mental factor) is congruent with a mental factor of cognizing with a bad view, such as the mental factor of cognizing with a disturbed view toward a transitory network, it shares the aspect of its cognitive grip (on its object).
(Tib.) bye smra phal cher dang slob dpon thogs med sku mched rnams kyis ma rig pa yin na lta min gyi ma rig pa yin pas khyab par bzhed de/ ‘jig lta ma rig par mi ‘dod pa’i phyir/ ma rig pa ma yin pa’i rgyu mtshan rig pa’i ‘gal zla mi mthun phyogs dang ma rtogs log rtogs gnyis las ma rtogs pa’i blo yin yang ‘jig lta sogs lta ngan dang mtshungs ldan du song tshe ‘dzin stangs kyi rnam can yin par bzhed
“General Vaibhashika” (bye-smra phal-cher) refers to the basic assertions accepted by all the sub-schools of Vaibhashika. Of these sub-schools, the Asanga brother Vasubandhu primarily presents and critiques the assertions of the Kashmiri Vaibhashika sub-school.
According to the Sanskrit etymology, a “cognitive grip” (‘dzin-stangs, Skt. muṣṭibandha) is a tight-fisted cognitive hold on an object. As a way of cognitively taking its object, the grip may be in accord with what the object is or how it exists, or it may be reversed.
For the Asanga brothers, when the mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view arises, an anti-knowing mental factor also arises congruent with it as a distinct mental factor with its own essential nature. Being congruent, however, the two mental factors share a common focal object – for example, the body. Not only that, but they also share a common cognitive grip on it. The cognitive grip on the body that this disturbing mental factor with a view has is one that cognitively takes the body in a reversed manner. As a type of disturbed discriminating, it cognitively takes it as being the possession and habitat of “me” as an atman and existing as “mine.” By the force of this disturbing mental factor, the anti-knowing that is congruent with it also cognitively takes the body in this reversed manner. But this does not make the two mental factors the same.
- The mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view is a distorted apprehension of the body. Although it is decisive, it is inaccurate.
- The mental factor of anti-knowing, by its own force, is a non-apprehension of the body. Merely stupefying the mind, it is neither decisive nor inaccurate.
Concerning the other camp of assertions, Sey Ngawang Tashi states in Analysis of Extremes (260):
Further, the Sautrantika Acharya Dharmatratagomin, the Glorious Dharmakirti and Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti and so on assert that there are two (types) of misknowing – (one that cognizes) with a view and (one that cognizes) not with view. They also assert that the mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view is a (type of) misknowing mental factor.
(Tib.) yang mdo sde ba’i slob dpon btsun pa chos skyobs dang/ dpal ldan chos grags dang/ legs ldan/ zla grags sogs ma rig pa la lta ba dang lta min gnyis bzhed cing ‘jig lta ma rig par bzhed do/
Dharmatratagomin (Tib. btsun-pa chos-skyobs, Skt. Dharmatrātagomin) was an early Sautrantika master considered as a forerunner of Dharmakirti in terms of his analysis of ways of cognizing.
Dharmakirti and so on assert that there are two types of misknowing:
- Misknowing that cognizes with a view is the misknowing that the five disturbing mental factors that cognize with an incorrect view are types of. In particular, the mental factor of cognizing a transitory network with a disturbed view is a type of misknowing.
- Misknowing that does not cognize with a view is the misknowing that is one of the ten disturbing mental factors – specifically, naivety (gti-mug, Skt. moha), one of the five that cognize without a view.
To gain a more precise understanding of the differences between the assertions of the two camps concerning an anti-knowing mental factor requires an analysis how the Nalanda masters of the various Buddhist tenet systems explain the topic, starting with Vasubandhu and his presentation of the Vaibhashika system.